At several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was now the master, Napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across the water which separated the starting points of his expedition from the United Kingdom.  Command of the sea to be won by a powerful naval combination was thus an essential element in Napoleon’s strategy at the time of Trafalgar.  It was not in deciding what was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred:  it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he went wrong.  The British strategy adopted in opposition to that of Napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of the command of the sea.  Formulated and carried into effect by seamen, it differed in some important features from his.  We may leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made in the English Channel to oppose the movements of Napoleon’s flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft.  The British strategy at the time of Trafalgar, as far as it was concerned with opposition to Napoleon’s sea-going fleets, may be succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which the enemy’s forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable strength.  Though some of our admirals, notably Nelson himself, objected to the application of the term ‘blockade’ to their plans, the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they should come out they would find outside their port a British force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them thoroughly and destroy them.  Beating them and thus having done with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what was desired by our admirals.  This necessitated a close watch on the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let the history of Cornwallis’s command off Brest and of Nelson’s off Toulon suffice to tell us.

The junction of two or more of Napoleon’s fleets would have ensured over almost any single British fleet a numerical superiority that would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost certain.  To meet this condition the British strategy contemplated the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment be effected.  By this step we should preserve, if not a numerical superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, even if undefeated, a certainty.  The strategic problem before our navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem.  The enemy’s concentration might be attempted either towards Brest or towards Toulon.  In the latter case, a superior force might fall upon our Mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in the Atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy’s ships from the Atlantic port or could follow and come up with them.  Against the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of Napoleon to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off Toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval control of the English Channel.