The control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects efficient mobile navy.  This is the fundamental condition on which the continued existence of the British Empire depends.  It is thoroughly well known to every foreign Government, friendly or unfriendly.  The true objective in naval warfare is the enemy’s navy.  That must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated into remaining in its ports.  Not one of these can be effected without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet.  The British Empire may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected:  it cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command of the sea.  This is not a result of deliberate policy:  it is inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between them.

Such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire:  such are its duties towards it.  Duties in the case are mutual, and some are owed to the fleet as well as by it.  It is incumbent on every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient.  It is not to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary contributions to its maintenance.  It is, indeed, very doubtful if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them.  It seems certain that the objections to this are greater than any benefit that it can confer.  Badgering our fellow-subjects beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is undignified and impolitic.  The greatest sum asked for by the most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income.  No one has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from those of another.  Adequate voluntary contribution is a different matter.

There are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of the Crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of the fleet—­ways, too, which would leave each in complete and unmenaced control of its own money.  Sea-power does not consist entirely of men-of-war.  There must be docks, refitting establishments, magazines, and depots of stores.  Ports, which men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might find a chance of making.  Moderate fixed fortifications are all the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active troops must be available.