Perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the statement of the other side of the question.  It would be a great mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be ports of refuge for our ships.  Though they were to serve that purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence.  What they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the means of refit.  This assurance will largely depend upon their power of resistance if attacked.  Before we can decide how to impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack against which they would have to be prepared.  If they are on a continent, like, for example, Gibraltar, attack on them by a land force, however improbable, is physically possible.  Against an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct help.  Most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming across the sea.  An essential characteristic of a naval base is that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks.  Some, and very often all, of these supplies are not of native production and must be brought to the base by sea.  If the enemy can stop their conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is really in control of its communications.  If he is in control of its communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised.  Similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed to reach it.  Thus the primary defence of the outlying base is the active, sea-going fleet.  Moderate local defence, chiefly of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be needed.  Though the enemy has not been able to obtain control of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised in these till our own ships can drive the enemy’s away.

Outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice of all immobile establishments.  When war does come, some of them almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the right place with regard to the critical area of operations.  They cannot, however, be moved.  It will be necessary to do what has been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more convenient situations.  Thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will have been wasted.  This inculcates the necessity of having not as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to get on with.