The demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps even more common in the over-sea parts of the British Empire.  Nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness of authorities who yield to it.  It was not by hanging about the coast of England, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, that Hawke or Nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen of their crews that the French and English fleets shut up their enemy in the Baltic and Black Sea, and thus gained and kept undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without interruption, to invade their enemy’s territory.

The condition insisted upon by the Australasian Governments in the agreement formerly made with the Home Government, that a certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution of money, should always remain in Australasian waters, was in reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire.  The Australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being injured in return for his money.  The proceeding would have been exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder’s own dwelling.  When still further localised naval defence—­localised defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description—­is considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious.  Localised defence is a near relation of passive defence.  It owes its origin to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy’s country.

There may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is practicable.  The immense costliness of modern navies puts it out of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going fleets.  The historic maritime countries—­Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Portugal, the performances of whose seamen are so justly celebrated—­could not now send to sea a force equal in number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed by anyone of the chief naval powers.  The countries named, when determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised character.