the sea,’ with the result that in the middle of the tenth century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of Heraclius.  Not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained.  ’At the close of the tenth century the emperors of Constantinople possessed the best and greatest part’ of Southern Italy, part of Sicily, the whole of what is now called the Balkan Peninsula, Asia Minor, with some parts of Syria and Armenia.[27]

[Footnote 25:  Hallam, Mid.Ages_, chap. vi.]

[Footnote 26:  Ameer Ali, Syed, ShortHist._Saracens_, p. 442]

[Footnote 27:  Hallam, chap. vi.; Gibbon, chap. li.]

Neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment.  Whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power of natural growth.  How was it possible for the Crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts?  How did the Christian kingdom of Jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century?  Why did the Crusades more and more become maritime expeditions?  The answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the Mohammedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the West.  Venetians, Pisans, and Genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the Christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels.  Even the great Saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions.  This is evident when we look at the efforts of the Christians to regain the lost kingdom.  Saladin ’forgot that the safety of Phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea.’[28] Not only were the Crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of Italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western Europe and England, on the ’arrival of MalikAnkiltar_ (Richard Coeur de Lion) with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.’

[Footnote 28:  Ameer Ali, Syed, pp. 359, 360.]

Participation in the Crusades was not a solitary proof of the importance of the naval states of Italy.  That they had been able to act effectively in the Levant may have been in some measure due to the weakening of the Mohammedans by the disintegration of the Seljukian power, the movements of the Moguls, and the confusion consequent on the rise of the Ottomans.  However that may have been, the naval strength of those Italian states was great absolutely as well as relatively.  Sismondi, speaking of Venice, Pisa, and Genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, says ’these three cities had more vessels on the Mediterranean