this, because no possible mode of attack—­the enemy’s fleet being formed as it was—­could have prevented some British ships from being ‘doubled on’ when they cut into the enemy’s force.  On ‘The First of June,’ notwithstanding that the advance to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several British ships were ‘doubled on,’ and even ‘trebled on,’ as will be seen in the experiences on that day of the Brunswick, Marlborough, RoyalSovereign_, and QueenCharlotte_ herself.

Owing to the shape of the hostile ‘line’ at Trafalgar and the formation in which he kept his division, Collingwood brought his ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum.  By the terms of that document Nelson had specifically assigned to his own division the work of seeing that the movements of Collingwood’s division should be interrupted as little as possible.  It would, of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after Collingwood was getting near his objective point.  In execution, therefore, of the service allotted to his division, Nelson made a feint at the enemy’s van.  This necessitated an alteration of course to port, so that his ships came into a ‘line-of-bearing’ so very oblique that it may well have been loosely called a ‘line-ahead.’  Sir Charles Ekins says that the two British lines ’afterwards fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,’ and that this was in obedience to signal.  Collingwood’s line certainly did not fall into line-ahead.  At the most it was a rather oblique line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy’s fleet which he was about to attack.  In Nelson’s line there was more than one alteration of course, as the Victory’s log expressly states that she kept standing for the enemy’s van, which we learn from the French accounts was moving about N. by E. or NNE.  In the light wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, even if the Victory were to shorten sail, which we know she did not.  As Admiral Colomb pointed out, ’Several later signals are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but not in lines-ahead.’  It is difficult to import into this fact any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy’s fleet had been distinguished.

When Collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for Nelson’s division to provide against the other’s being interrupted.  Accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into the enemy’s fleet.  Now came the moment, as regards his division, for doing what Collingwood’s had already begun to do, viz. engage in a ’pell-mell battle,’[88] which surely may be interpreted as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no longer expected, and in which ’no captain could do very wrong if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.’