It is now necessary to investigate the statement that Nelson, hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the battle.  This investigation is much more difficult than that into the losses of the British fleet, because, whilst the latter can be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon conjecture.  How desirable it is to make the investigation of the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the curious fact that the very completeness of Nelson’s success at Trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study of tactics in the British Navy for more than three-quarters of a century.  His action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel in our service that Nelson’s method consisted merely in rushing at his enemy as soon as he saw him.  Against this conception his biographers, one after another, have protested in vain.

At the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered.  One of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself are not the same operations.  Another is, that, in the order of sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were ‘by the wind’ or close-hauled—­the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, but bore from one another in the direction of the wind.  Also, it may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the same operation.  Again, adherence to a plan which presupposes the enemy’s fleet to be in a particular formation after he is found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate tactician.  This remark is introduced here with full knowledge of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that Nelson did change his plan without warning.  No admission of the kind is intended.  ‘In all cases of anticipated battle,’ says Mahan, ’Nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.’  The same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that ’No man was ever better served than Nelson by the inspiration of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.’

The plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of 9th October 1805 indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the British fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main divisions and an ‘advance squadron,’ would move against an enemy assumed to be in single line-ahead.  The ‘advance squadron,’ it should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either.  The name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, ’feeling for’ the enemy.  On 19th October six ships were ordered ’to go ahead during the night’; and, besides the frigates, two more ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between the six and the commander-in-chief’s flag-ship.  Thus eight ships in effect composed an ‘advance squadron,’ and did not join either of the main divisions at first.