in the battle.  It is a remarkable document.  Being critical rather than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of Clerk of Eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the investigation of tactical questions ever published in the English tongue.  On it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable views expressed concerning the British tactics at Trafalgar.  As it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism of Nelson’s action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we criticise it in its turn.

Notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have an academic tinge.  In fact, they are very much of the kind that a clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class of students.  Between a professor of tactics, however clever, and a commanding genius like Nelson the difference is great indeed.  The writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more general opinion of his day.  He has certainly suggested opinions to later generations of naval officers.  The captains who shared in Nelson’s last great victory did not agree among themselves as to the mode in which the attack was introduced.  It was believed by some of them, and, thanks largely to the Conqueror officer’s paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas Nelson had announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead.  Following up the path of investigation to which, in his article above mentioned, Admiral Colomb had already pointed, we can, I think, arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was adhered to.

Before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that Nelson exposed his fleet at Trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting it in the power of the enemy—­to use the words of the Conqueror’s officer—­to ’have annihilated the ships one after another in detail’; and that ’the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt’ had a different mode of advance from that actually chosen been adopted.  Now, Trafalgar was a battle in which an inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior fleet of thirty-three.  The victory was so decisive that more than half of the enemy’s capital ships were captured or destroyed on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell an easy prey to the victor’s side soon after the battle, the rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port near at hand.  To gain such a victory over a superior force of seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very hard fighting was necessary.  The only actions of the Napoleonic period that can be compared with it are those of Camperdown, the Nile, and Copenhagen.