In this tissue of adverse events, the discovery of the order of march by General McClellan occupies a very prominent place.  This incident resembles what the French call a fatality.  Who was to blame for the circumstance still remains a mystery; but it may be said with entire certainty that the brave officer upon whom it was charged was entirely guiltless of all fault in the matter.

[Footnote:  The officer here referred to is General D.H.  Hill.  General McClellan said in his testimony afterward, before the congressional committee:  “When at Frederick, we found the original order issued to D.H.  Hill,” etc.  The inference was thus a natural one that General Hill was to blame, but that officer has proved clearly that he had nothing to do with the affair.  He received but one copy of the order, which was handed to him by General Jackson in person, and, knowing its great importance, he placed it in his pocket-book, and still retains it in his possession.  This fact is conclusive, since General Hill could not have “lost” what he continues to hold in his hands.  This mystery will be cleared up at some time, probably; at present, but one thing is certain, that General Hill was in no manner to blame.  The present writer desires to make this statement as explicit as possible, as, in other accounts of these transactions, he was led by General McClellan’s language to attribute blame to General Hill where he deserved none.]

Whatever may have been the secret history of the “lost dispatch,” however, it certainly fell into General McClellan’s hands, and largely directed the subsequent movements of the opposing armies.

From what is here written, it will be seen that Lee was not justly chargeable with the result of the Maryland campaign.  He had provided for every thing as far as lay in his power.  Had he not been disappointed in events to be fairly anticipated, it seemed his force would have received large accessions, his rear would have closed up, and the advance into Pennsylvania would have taken place.  Instead of this, he was forced to retire and fight a pitched battle at Sharpsburg; and this action certainly exhibited on Lee’s part military ability of the highest order.  The force opposed to him had been at least double that of his own army, and the Federal troops had fought with a gallantry unsurpassed in any other engagement of the war.  That their assault on Lee failed, was due to the fighting qualities of his troops and his own generalship.  His army had been manoeuvred with a rapidity and precision which must have excited even the admiration of the distinguished soldier opposed to him.  He had promptly concentrated his forces opposite every threatened point in turn, and if he had not been able to carry out the axiom of Napoleon, that a commander should always be superior to the enemy at the point of contact, he had at least done all that was possible to effect that end, and had so far succeeded as to have repulsed if not routed his