The state of things in Maryland was another important consideration.  That great Commonwealth was known to be sectionally divided in its sentiment toward the Federal Government, the eastern portion adhering generally to the side of the South, and the western portion generally to the Federal side.  But, even as high up as Frederick, it was hoped that the Southern cause would find adherents and volunteers to march under the Confederate banner.  If this portion of the population had only the opportunity to choose their part, unterrified by Federal bayonets, it was supposed they would decide for the South.  In any event, the movement would be important.  The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says, “encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington Government to retain all its available force to provide for contingencies which its course toward the people of that State gave it reason to apprehend,” and to cross the Potomac “might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty.”

It may be said, in summing up on this point, that Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared this expectation.  The identity of sentiment generally between the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result afterward was extremely bitter.

Such were the first designs of Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear.  By advancing into Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies, while his own communications would remain open by way of the Shenandoah Valley.  This was essentially the same plan pursued in the campaign of 1863, which terminated in the battle of Gettysburg.  General Lee’s movements now indicated similar intentions.  He doubtless wished, in the first place, to compel the enemy to pursue him—­then to lead them as far as was prudent—­and then, if circumstances were favorable, bring them to decisive battle, success in which promised to open for him the gates of Washington or Baltimore, and end the war.

It will now be seen how the delay caused by the movement of Jackson against Harper’s Ferry, and the discovery by General McClellan of the entire arrangement devised by Lee for that purpose, caused the failure of this whole ulterior design.