The contest of generalship had now fully begun, and the brain of General Lee was matched against the brain of General Pope.  It is no part of the design of the writer of this volume to exalt unduly the reputation of Lee, and detract from the credit due his adversaries.  Justice has been sought to be done to General McClellan; the same measure of justice will be dealt out to his successors on the Federal side; nor is it calculated to elevate the fame of Lee, to show that his opponents were incapable and inefficient.  Of General Pope, however, it must be said that he suffered himself to be outgeneralled in every particular; and the pithy comment of General Lee, that he “did not appear to be aware of his situation,” sums up the whole subject.

It is beyond our purpose to enter upon any thing resembling a detailed narrative of the confused and complicated movements of the various corps of the army under General Pope.  These have been the subject of the severest criticism by his own followers.  We shall simply notice the naked events.  Jackson reached Manassas on the night of August 26th, took it, and on the next day destroyed the great depot.  General Pope was hastening to protect it, but was delayed by Ewell at Bristoe, and a force sent up from Washington, under the brave General Taylor, was driven off with loss.  Then, having achieved his aim, Jackson fell back toward Sudley.

If the reader will look at the map, he will now understand the exact condition of affairs.  Jackson had burned the Federal depot of supplies, and retired before the great force hastening to rescue them.  He had with him about twenty thousand men, and General Pope’s force was probably triple that number.  Thus, the point was to hold General Pope at arm’s-length until the arrival of Lee; and, to accomplish this great end, Jackson fell back beyond Groveton.  There he formed line of battle, and waited.

It is obvious that, under these circumstances, the true policy of General Pope was to obstruct Thoroughfare Gap, the only road by which Lee could approach promptly, and then crush Jackson.  On the night of the 27th, General McDowell was accordingly sent thither with forty thousand men; but General Pope ordered him, on the next morning, to Manassas, where he hoped to “bag the whole crowd,” he said—­that is to say, the force under Jackson.  This was the fatal mistake made by General Pope.  Thoroughfare Gap was comparatively undefended.  While General Pope was marching to attack Jackson, who had disappeared, it was the next thing to a certainty that General Lee would attack him.

All parties were thus moving to and fro; but the Confederates enjoyed the very great advantage over General Pope of knowing precisely how affairs stood, and of having determined upon their own plan of operations.  Jackson, with his back to the mountain, was waiting for Lee.  Lee was approaching rapidly, to unite the two halves of his army.  General Pope, meanwhile, was marching and countermarching, apparently ignorant of the whereabouts of Jackson,[1]