In face of this large force occupying a commanding position on the heights, General Lee made no effort to cross.  He determined, he says, “not to attempt the passage of the river at that point with the army,” but to “seek a more favorable place to cross, higher up the river, and thus gain the enemy’s right.”  This manoeuvre was intrusted to Jackson, whose corps formed the Confederate left wing.  Jackson advanced promptly to the Warrenton Springs Ford, which had been selected as the point of crossing, drove away a force of the enemy posted at the place, and immediately began to pass the river with his troops.  The movement was however interrupted by a severe rain-storm, which swelled the waters of the Rappahannock, and rendered a further prosecution of it impracticable.  General Lee was thus compelled to give up that plan, and ordered Jackson to withdraw the force which had crossed.  This was done, and General Lee was now called upon to adopt some other method of attack; or to remain inactive in face of the enemy.

But to remain inactive was impossible.  The army must either advance or retire; information which had just reached the Confederate general rendered one of these two proceedings indispensable.  The information referred to had been obtained by General Stuart.  The activity and energy of this officer, especially in gaining intelligence, now proved, as they proved often afterward, of the utmost importance to Lee.  Stuart had been directed by General Lee to make an attack, with a cavalry force, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, in the enemy’s rear; he had promptly carried out his orders by striking the Federal communications at Catlett’s Station, had destroyed there all that he found, and torn up the railroad, but, better than all, had captured a box containing official papers belonging to General Pope.  These papers, which Stuart hastened—­marching day and night, through storm and flood—­to convey to General Lee, presented the clearest evidence of the enemy’s movements and designs.  Troops were hastening from every direction to reenforce General Pope, the entire force on James River especially was to be brought rapidly north of the Rappahannock, and any delay in the operations of the Confederates would thus expose them to attack from the Federal forces concentrated from all quarters in their front.

[Illustration:  Map—­Upper Rappahannock]

IV.

JACKSON FLANKS GENERAL POPE.

It was thus necessary to act with decision, and General Lee resolved upon a movement apparently of the most reckless character.  This was to separate his army into two parts, and, while one remained confronting the enemy on the Rappahannock, send the other by a long circuit to fall on the Federal rear near Manassas.  This plan of action was opposed to the first rule of the military art, that a general should never divide his force in the face of an enemy.  That Lee ventured