unwilling to assail this force, under command of soldiers like Johnston and Lee, until his own force seemed adequate to the undertaking.  Another consideration was, the Confederate position in front of the powerful earthworks of the city.  These works would double the Confederate strength in case of battle in front of them; and, believing himself already outnumbered, the Federal commander was naturally loath to deliver battle until reenforced.  The faulty disposition of his army, divided by a stream crossed by few bridges, has been accounted for in like manner—­he so disposed the troops, expecting reenforcements.  But Jackson’s energy delayed these.  Washington was in danger, it was supposed, and General McDowell did not come.  It thus happened that General McClellan awaited attack instead of making it, and that his army was so posted as to expose him to the greatest peril.

A last point is to be noted in vindication of this able soldier.  Finding, at the very last moment, that he could expect no further assistance from the President or General Halleck, he resolved promptly to withdraw his exposed right wing and change his base of operations to James River, where at least his communications would be safe.  This, it seems, had been determined upon just before the Confederate attack; or, if he had not then decided, General McClellan soon determined upon that plan.

To pass now to the Confederate side, where all was ready for the great movement.  General Lee’s army lay in front of Richmond, exactly corresponding with the front of General McClellan.  The divisions of Magruder and Huger, supported by those of Longstreet and D.H.  Hill, were opposite McClellan’s left, on the Williamsburg and York River roads, directly east of the city.  From Magruder’s left, extended the division of General A.P.  Hill, reaching thence up the river toward Mechanicsville; and a brigade, under General Branch lay on Hill’s left near the point where the Brook Turnpike crosses the Chickahominy north of Richmond.  The approaches from the east, northeast, and north, were thus carefully guarded.  As the Confederates held the interior line, the whole force could be rapidly concentrated, and was thoroughly in hand, both for offensive or defensive movements.

The army thus held in Lee’s grasp, and about to assail its great Federal adversary, was composed of the best portion of the Southern population.  The rank and file was largely made up of men of education and high social position.  And this resulted from the character of the struggle.  The war was a war of invasion on the part of the North; and the ardent and high-spirited youth of the entire South threw themselves into it with enthusiasm.  The heirs of ancient families and great wealth served as privates.  Personal pride, love of country, indignation at the thought that a hostile section had sent an army to reduce them to submission, combined to draw into the Confederate ranks the flower of the Southern youth, and all the best fighting material.  Deficient in discipline, and “hard to manage,” this force was yet of the most efficient character.  It could be counted on for hard work, and especially for offensive operations.  And the officers placed over it shared its character.