By the spring of 1862 a force of about two hundred thousand men was ready to take the field in Virginia.  General Scott was not to command in the coming campaigns.  He had retired in the latter part of the year 1861, and his place had been filled by a young officer of rising reputation—­General George B. McClellan, who had achieved the successes of Rich Mountain and Carrick’s Ford in Western Virginia.  General McClellan was not yet forty, but had impressed the authorities with a high opinion of his abilities.  A soldier by profession, and enjoying the distinction of having served with great credit in the Mexican War, he had been sent as United States military commissioner to the Crimea, and on his return had written a book of marked ability on the military organizations of the powers of Europe.  When the struggle between the North and South approached, he was said—­with what truth we know not—­to have hesitated, before determining upon his course; but it is probable that the only question with him was whether he should fight for the North or remain neutral.  In his politics he was a Democrat, and the war on the South is said to have shocked his State-rights view.  But, whatever his sentiments had been, he accepted command, and fought a successful campaign in Western Virginia.  From that moment his name became famous; he was said to have achieved “two victories in one day,” and he received from the newspapers the flattering name of “the Young Napoleon.”

The result of this successful campaign, slight in importance as it was, procured for General McClellan the high post of commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.  Operations in every portion of the South were to be directed by him; and he was especially intrusted with the important work of organizing the new levies at Washington.  This he performed with very great ability.  Under his vigorous hand, the raw material soon took shape.  He gave his personal attention to every department; and the result, as we have said, in the early spring of 1862, was an army of more than two hundred thousand men, for operations in Virginia alone.

The great point now to be determined was the best line of operations against Richmond.  President Lincoln was strongly in favor of an advance by way of Manassas and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, which he thought would insure the safety of the Federal capital.  This was always, throughout the whole war, a controlling consideration with him; and, regarded in the light of subsequent events, this solicitude seems to have been well founded.  More than once afterward, General Lee—­to use his own expression—­thought of “swapping queens,” that is to say, advancing upon Washington, without regard to the capture of Richmond; and President Lincoln, with that excellent good sense which he generally exhibited, felt that the loss of Washington would prove almost fatal to the Federal cause.—­Such was the origin of the President’s preference for the Manassas