Crossing the Pamunkey at Hanovertown, after a rapid night-march, General Grant sent out a force toward Hanover Court-House to cut off Lee’s retreat or discover his position.  This resulted in nothing, since General Lee had not moved in that direction.  He had, as soon as the movement of General Grant was discovered, put his lines in motion, directed his march across the country on the direct route to Cold Harbor, and, halting behind the Tottapotomoi, had formed his line there, to check the progress of his adversary on the main road from Hanovertown toward Richmond.  For the third time, thus, General Grant had found his adversary in his path; and no generalship, or rapidity in the movement of his column, seemed sufficient to secure to him the advantages of a surprise.  On each occasion the march of the Federal army had taken place in the night; from the Wilderness on the night of May 7th; from Spottsylvania on the night of May 21st; and from near the North Anna on the night of May 26th.  Lee had imitated these movements of his opponent, interposing on each occasion, at the critical moment, in his path, and inviting battle.  This last statement may be regarded as too strongly expressed, as it seems the opinion of Northern writers that Lee, in these movements, aimed only to maintain a strict defensive, and, by means of breastworks, simply keep his adversary at arm’s length.  This is an entire mistake.  Confident of the efficiency of his army, small as it was, he was always desirous to bring on a decisive action, under favorable circumstances.  General Early bears his testimony to the truth of this statement.  “I happen to know,” says this officer, “that General Lee had always the greatest anxiety to strike at Grant in the open field.”  During the whole movement from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, the Confederate commander was in excellent spirits.  When at Hanover Junction he spoke of the situation almost jocosely, and said to the venerable Dr. Gwathmey, speaking of General Grant, “If I can get one more pull at him, I will defeat him.”

This expression does not seem to indicate any depression or want of confidence in his ability to meet General Grant in an open pitched battle.  It may, however, be asked why, if such were his desire, he did not come out from behind his breastworks and fight.  The reply is, that General Grant invariably defended his lines by breastworks as powerful as—­in many cases much more powerful than—­his adversary’s.  The opposing mounds of earth and trees along the routes of the two armies remain to prove the truth of what is here stated.  At Cold Harbor, especially, the Federal works are veritable forts.  In face of them, the theory that General Grant uniformly acted upon the offensive, without fear of offensive operations in turn on the part of Lee, will be found untenable.  Nor is this statement made with the view of representing General Grant as over-cautious, or of detracting from his merit as a commander.  It was, on the contrary, highly honorable to him, that, opposed to an adversary of such ability, he should have neglected nothing.