Finding that his opponent was not disposed to renew hostilities.  General Lee, on the 19th of May, sent General Ewell to turn his right flank; but this movement resulted in nothing, save the discovery by General Ewell that the Federal army was moving.  This intelligence was dispatched to General Lee on the evening of the 21st, and reached him at Souther’s House, on the banks of the Po, where he was calmly reconnoitring the position of the enemy.

As soon as he read the note of General Ewell, he mounted his horse, saying, in his grave voice, to his staff, “Come, gentlemen;” and orders were sent to the army to prepare to move.  The troops began their march on the same night, in the direction of Hanover Junction, which they reached on the evening of the 22d.  When, on May 23d, General Grant reached the banks of the North Anna, he found Lee stationed on the south bank, ready to oppose his crossing.

The failure of General Grant to reach and seize upon the important point of Hanover Junction before the arrival of Lee, decided the fate of the plan of campaign originally devised by him.  If the reader will glance at the map of Virginia, this fact will become apparent.  Hanover Junction is the point where the Virginia Central and Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads cross each other, and is situated in the angle of the North Anna and South Anna Rivers, which unite a short distance below to form the Pamunkey.  Once in possession of this point, General Grant would have had easy communication with the excellent base of supplies at Aquia Creek; would have cut the Virginia Central Railroad; and a direct march southward would have enabled him to invest Richmond from the north and northwest, in accordance with his original plan.  Lee had, however, reached the point first, and from that moment, unless the Southern force were driven from its position, the entire plan of campaign must necessarily be changed.

The great error of General Grant in this arduous campaign would seem to have been the feebleness of the attack which he here made upon Lee.  The position of the Southern army was not formidable, and on his arrival they had had no time to erect defences.  The river is not difficult of crossing, and the ground on the south bank gives no decided advantage to a force occupying it.  In spite of these facts—­which it is proper to say General Grant denies, however—­nothing was effected, and but little attempted.  A few words will sum up the operations of the armies during the two or three days.  Reaching the river, General Grant threw a column across some miles up the stream, at a point known as Jericho Ford, where a brief but obstinate encounter ensued between Generals Hill and Warren, and this was followed by the capture of an old redoubt defending the Chesterfield bridge, near the railroad crossing, opposite Lee’s right, which enabled another column to pass the stream at that point.  These two successful passages of the river on Lee’s left and right seemed to indicate a fixed intention on the part of his adversary to press both the Southern flanks, and bring on a decisive engagement; and, to cooeperate in this plan, a third column was now thrown over opposite Lee’s centre.