disappointed at missing a battle with Lee in October.  A stronger argument in favor of active operations lay in the situation, at the moment, of the Southern army.  Lee, anticipating no further fighting during the remainder of the year, opposed the enemy on the Rapidan with only one of his two corps—­that of Ewell; while the other—­that of Hill—­was thrown back, in detached divisions, at various points on the Orange and the Virginia Central Railroads, for the purpose of subsistence during the winter.  This fact, becoming known to General Meade, dictated, it is said, his plan of operations.  An advance seemed to promise, from the position of the Southern forces, a decisive success.  Ewell’s right extended no farther than Morton’s Ford, on the Rapidan, and thus the various fords down to Chancellorsville were open.  If General Meade could cross suddenly, and by a rapid march interpose between Ewell and the scattered divisions of Hill far in rear, it appeared not unreasonable to conclude that Lee’s army would be completely disrupted, and that the two corps, one after another, might be crushed by the Federal army.

This plan, which is given on the authority of Northern writers, exhibited good soldiership, and, if Lee were to be caught unawares, promised to succeed.  Without further comment we shall now proceed to the narrative of this brief movement, which, indecisive as it was in its results, was not uninteresting, and may prove as attractive to the military student as other operations more imposing and accompanied by bloodier fighting.

General Meade began to move toward the Rapidan on November 26th, and every exertion was made by him to advance with such secrecy and rapidity as to give him the advantage of a surprise.  In this, however, he was disappointed.  No sooner had his orders been issued, and the correspondent movements begun, than the accomplished scouts of Stuart hurried across the Rapidan with the intelligence.  Stuart, whose headquarters were in a hollow of the hills near Orange, and not far from General Lee’s, promptly communicated in person to the commander-in-chief this important information, and Lee dispatched immediately an order to General A.P.  Hill, in rear, to march at once and form a junction with Ewell in the vicinity of Verdierville.  The latter officer was directed to retire from his advanced position upon the Rapidan, which exposed him to an attack on his right flank and rear, and to fall back and take post behind the small stream called Mine Run.

In following with a critical eye the operations of General Lee, the military student must be struck particularly by one circumstance, that in all his movements he seemed to proceed less according to the nice technicalities of the art of war, than in accordance with the dictates of a broad and comprehensive good sense.  It may be said that, in choosing position, he always chose the right and never the wrong one; and the choice of Mine Run now as a defensive line was a proof of