Bristoe, where, on approaching that point, he found only the rear-guard of the Federal army—­the whole force, with this exception, having crossed Broad Run, and hastened on toward Manassas.  Hill’s arrival had thus been tardy:  it would have been fortunate for him if he had not arrived at all.  Seeing the Federal column under General Warren hastening along the railroad to pass Broad Run, he ordered a prompt attack, and Cooke’s brigade led the charge.  The result was unfortunate for the Confederates.  General Warren, seeing his peril, had promptly disposed his line behind the railroad embankment at the spot, where, protected by this impromptu breastwork, the men rested their guns upon the iron rails and poured a destructive fire upon the Southerners rushing down the open slope in front.  By this fire General Cooke was severely wounded and fell, and his brigade lost a considerable part of its numbers.  Before a new attack could be made, General Warren hastily withdrew, carrying off with him in triumph a number of prisoners, and five pieces of artillery, captured on the banks of the run.  Before his retreat could be again interrupted, he was safe on the opposite side of the stream, and lost no time in hurrying forward to join the main body, which was retreating on Centreville.

General Meade had thus completely foiled his adversary.  Lee had set out with the intention of bringing the Federal commander to battle; had not succeeded in doing so, owing to the rapidity of his retreat; had come up only with his rear-guard, under circumstances which seemed to seal the fate of that detached force, and the small rear-guard had repulsed him completely, capturing prisoners and artillery from him, and retiring in triumph.  Such had been the issue of the campaign; all the success had been on the side of General Meade.  He is said to have declared that “it was like pulling out his eye-teeth not to have had a fight;” but something resembling bona-fide fighting had occurred on the banks of Broad Run, and the victory was clearly on the side of the Federal troops.

To turn to General Lee, it would be an interesting question to discuss whether he really desired to intercept General Meade, if there were any data upon which to base a decision.  The writer hazards the observation that it seems doubtful whether this was Lee’s intention.  He had a high opinion of General Meade, and is said to have declared of that commander, that he “gave him” (Lee) “as much trouble as any of them.”  Lee was thus opposed to a soldier whose ability he respected, and it appears doubtful whether he desired to move so rapidly as to expose his own communications to interruption by his adversary.  This view seems to derive support from the apparently unnecessary delays at Culpepper Court-House and Warrenton.  There was certainly no good reason why, under ordinary circumstances, an army so accustomed to rapid marches as the Army of Northern Virginia should not have been able to