The army continued, nevertheless, to amuse itself at the expense of the cavalry, and either asserted or intimated, on every favorable occasion, that the real fighting was done by themselves.  This flattering assumption might be natural under the circumstances, but it was now about to be shown to be wholly unfounded.  A campaign was at hand in which the cavalry were to turn the tables upon their jocose critics, and silence them; where the infantry were doomed to failure in nearly all which they attempted, and the troopers were to do the greater part of the fighting and achieve the only successes.

To the narrative of this brief and romantic episode of the war we now proceed.  General Lee’s aim was to pass around the right flank of his adversary, and bring him to battle; and, although the promptness of General Meade’s movements defeated the last-named object nearly completely, the manoeuvres of the two armies form a highly-interesting study.  The eminent soldiers commanding the forces played a veritable game of chess with each other.  There was little hard fighting, but more scientific manoeuvring than is generally displayed in a campaign.  The brains of Lee and Meade, rather than the two armies, were matched against each other; and the conflict of ideas proved more interesting than the actual fighting.

II.

LEE FLANKS GENERAL MEADE.

In prosecution of the plan determined upon, General Lee, on the morning of the 9th of October, crossed the Rapidan at the fords above Orange Court-House, with the corps of Ewell and A.P.  Hill, and directed his march toward Madison Court-House.

Stuart moved with Hampton’s cavalry division on the right of the advancing column—­General Fitz Lee having been left with his division to guard the front on the Rapidan—­and General Imboden, commanding west of the Blue Ridge, was ordered by Lee to “advance down the Valley, and guard the gaps of the mountains on our left.”

We have said that Lee’s design was to bring General Meade to battle.  It is proper to state this distinctly, as some writers have attributed to him in the campaign, as his real object, the design of manoeuvring his adversary out of Culpepper, and pushing him back to the Federal frontier.  His own words are perfectly plain.  He set out “with the design,” he declares, “of bringing on an engagement with the Federal army”—­that is to say, of fighting General Meade, not simply forcing him to fall back.  His opponent, it seems, was not averse to accepting battle; indeed, from expressions attributed to him, he appears to have ardently desired it, in case he could secure an advantageous position for receiving the Southern attack.  It is desirable that this readiness in both commanders to fight should be kept in view.  The fact adds largely to the interest of this brief “campaign of manoeuvres,” in which the army, falling back, like that advancing, sought battle.