In following the movements, and describing the operations of the main body of the army—­the infantry—­we have necessarily been compelled to pass over, to a great extent, the services of the cavalry in the past campaign.  These had, nevertheless, been great—­no arm of the service had exhibited greater efficiency; and, but for the fact that in all armies the brunt of battle falls upon the foot-soldiers, it might be added that the services of the cavalry had been as important as those of the infantry.  Stuart was now in command of a force varying from five to eight thousand sabres, and among his troopers were some of the best fighting-men of the South.  The cavalry had always been the favorite arm with the Southern youth; it had drawn to itself, as privates in the ranks, thousands of young men of collegiate education, great wealth, and the highest social position; and this force was officered, in Virginia, by such resolute commanders as Wade Hampton, Fitz Lee, William H.F.  Lee, Rosser, Jones, Wickham, Young, Munford, and many others.  Under these leaders, and assisted by the hard-fighting “Stuart Horse-Artillery” under Pelham and his successors, the cavalry had borne their full share in the hard marches and combats of the army.  On the Chickahominy; in the march to Manassas, and the battles in Maryland; in the operations on the Rappahannock, and the incessant fighting of the campaign to Gettysburg, Stuart and his troopers had vindicated their claim to the first honors of arms; and, if these services were not duly estimated by the infantry of the army, the fact was mainly attributable to the circumstance that the fighting of the cavalry had been done at a distance upon the outposts, far more than in the pitched battles, where, in modern times, from the improved and destructive character of artillery, playing havoc with horses, the cavalry arm can achieve little, and is not risked.  The actual losses in Stuart’s command left, however, no doubt of the obstinate soldiership of officers and men.  Since the opening of the year he had lost General Hampton, cut down in a hand-to-hand sabre-fight at Gettysburg; General W.H.F.  Lee, shot in the fight at Fleetwood; Colonels Frank Hampton and Williams, killed in the same action; Colonel Butler, torn by a shell; Major Pelham, Chief of Artillery, killed while leading a charge; [Footnote:  In this enumeration the writer mentions only such names as occur at the moment to his memory.  A careful examination of the records of the cavalry would probably furnish the names of ten times as many, equally brave and unfortunate.] about six officers of his personal staff either killed, wounded, or captured; and in the Gettysburg campaign he had lost nearly one-third of his entire command.  Of its value to the army, the infantry might have their doubts, but General Lee had none.  Stuart and his horsemen had been the eyes and ears of the Army of Northern Virginia; had fought incessantly as well as observed the enemy; and Lee never committed the injustice of undervaluing this indispensable arm, which, if his official commendation of its operations under Stuart is to be believed, was only second in importance in his estimation to the infantry itself.