What is certain, however, is that the Southern army, if diminished in numbers and strength, was still unshaken.

XX.

LEE’S RETREAT ACROSS THE POTOMAC.

Lee commenced his retreat in the direction of the Potomac on the night of the 4th of July.  That the movement did not begin earlier is the best proof of the continued efficiency of his army and his own willingness to accept battle if the enemy were inclined to offer it.

After the failure of the attack on the Federal centre, he had withdrawn Ewell from his position southeast of Gettysburg, and, forming a continuous line of battle on Seminary Ridge, awaited the anticipated assault of General Meade.  What the result of such an assault would have been it is impossible to say, but the theory that an attack would have terminated in the certain rout of the Southern army has nothing whatever to support it.  The morale of Lee’s army was untouched.  The men, instead of being discouraged by the tremendous conflicts of the preceding days, were irate, defiant, and ready to resume the struggle.  Foreign officers, present at the time, testify fully upon this point, describing the demeanor of the troops as all that could be desired in soldiers; and General Longstreet afterward stated that, with his two divisions under Hood and McLaws, and his powerful artillery, he was confident, had the enemy attacked, of inflicting upon them a blow as heavy as that which they had inflicted upon Pickett.  The testimony of General Meade himself fully corroborates these statements.  When giving his evidence afterward before the war committee, he said: 

“My opinion is, now, that General Lee evacuated that position, not from the fear that he would be dislodged from it by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent to Harper’s Ferry to cut off his communications....  That was what caused him to retire.”

When asked the question, “Did you discover, after the battle of Gettysburg, any symptoms of demoralization in Lee’s army?” General Meade replied, “No, sir; I saw nothing of that kind."[1]

[Footnote 1:  Report of Committee on Conduct of War, Part I., page 337.]

There was indeed no good reason why General Lee should feel any extreme solicitude for the safety of his army, which, after all its losses, still numbered more than fifty thousand troops; and, with that force of veteran combatants, experience told him, he could count upon holding at bay almost any force which the enemy could bring against him.  At Chancellorsville, with a less number, he had nearly routed a larger army than General Meade’s.  If the morale of the men remained unbroken, he had the right to feel secure now; and we have shown that the troops were as full of fight as ever.  The exclamations of the ragged infantry, overheard by Colonel Freemantle, expressed the sentiment of the whole army.  Recoiling from the fatal charge on Cemetery Hill, and still followed by the terrible fire, they had heart to shout defiantly:  “We’ve not lost confidence in the old man!  This day’s work won’t do him no harm!  Uncle Robert will get us into Washington yet—­you bet he will!”