A preliminary conflict, brought on by the Federal commander, took place early in the morning.  Ewell had continued throughout the night to hold the enemy’s breastworks on their right, from which he had driven them in the evening.  As dawn approached now, he was about to resume the attack; and, in obedience to Lee’s orders, attempt to “dislodge the enemy” from other parts of the ridge, when General Meade took the initiative, and opened upon him a furious fire of cannon, which was followed by a determined infantry charge to regain the hill.  Ewell held his ground with the obstinate nerve which characterized him, and the battle raged about four hours—­that is, until about eight o’clock.  At that time, however, the pressure of the enemy became too heavy to stand.  General Meade succeeded in driving Ewell from the hill, and the Federal lines were reestablished on the commanding ground which they had previously occupied.

This event probably deranged, in some degree, General Lee’s plans, which contemplated, as we have seen, an attack by Ewell contemporaneous with the main assault by Longstreet.  Ewell was in no condition at this moment to assume the offensive again; and the pause in the fighting appears to have induced General Lee to reflect and modify his plans.  Throughout the hours succeeding the morning’s struggle, Lee, attended by Generals Hill and Longstreet, and their staff-officers, rode along the lines, reconnoitring the opposite heights, and the cavalcade was more than once saluted by bullets from the enemy’s sharp-shooters, and an occasional shell.  The result of the reconnoissance seems to have been the conclusion that the Federal left—­now strengthened by breastworks, behind which powerful reserves lay waiting—­was not a favorable point for attack.  General Meade, no doubt, expected an assault there; and, aroused to a sense of his danger by the Confederate success of the previous day, had made every preparation to meet a renewal of the movement.  The Confederate left and centre remained, but it seemed injudicious to think of attacking from Ewell’s position.  A concentration of the Southern force there would result in a dangerous separation of the two wings of the army; and, in the event of failure, the enemy would have no difficulty in descending and turning Lee’s right flank, and thus interposing between him and the Potomac.

The centre only was left, and to this Lee now turned his attention.  A determined rush, with a strong column at Cemetery Hill in his front, might wrest that point from the enemy.  Then their line would be pierced; the army would follow; Lee would be rooted on this commanding ground, directly between the two Federal wings, upon which their own guns might be turned, and the defeat of General Meade must certainly follow.  Such were, doubtless, the reflections of General Lee, as he rode along the Seminary Range, scanning, through his field-glass, the line of the Federal works.  His decision was made, and orders