forward to oppose Longstreet.  This reenforcement was continuous throughout the entire afternoon.  In spite of Lee’s demonstrations in other quarters to direct attention, General Meade—­driven by necessity—­continued to move fresh troops incessantly to protect his left; and success finally came as the reward of his energy and soldiership.  Longstreet found his weary troops met at every new step in advance by fresh lines, and, as night had now come, he discontinued the attack.  The Federal lines had been driven considerably beyond the point which they had held before the assault, and were now east of the wheat-field, where some of the hardest fighting of the day had taken place, but, in spite of this loss of ground, they had suffered no serious disaster, and, above all, Lee had not seized upon that “crest of the ridge,” which was the keystone of the position.

Thus Longstreet’s attack had been neither a success nor a failure.  He had not accomplished all that was expected, but he had driven back the enemy from their advanced position, and held strong ground in their front.  A continuance of the assault was therefore deferred until the next day—­night having now come—­and General Longstreet ordered the advance to cease, and the firing to be discontinued.

During the action on the right, Hill had continued to make heavy demonstrations on the Federal centre, and Ewell had met with excellent success in the attack, directed by Lee, to be made against the enemy’s right.  This was posted upon the semicircular eminence, a little southeast of Gettysburg, and the Federal works were attacked by Ewell about sunset.  With Early’s division on his right, and Johnson’s on his left, Ewell advanced across the open ground in face of a heavy artillery-fire, the men rushed up the slope, and in a brief space of time the Federal artillerists and infantry were driven from the works, which at nightfall remained in Ewell’s hands.

Such had been the fate of the second struggle around Gettysburg.  The moon, which rose just as the fighting terminated, threw its ghastly glare upon a field where neither side had achieved full success.

Lee had not failed, and he had not succeeded.  He had aimed to drive the Federal forces from the Cemetery Range, and had not been able to effect that object; but they had been forced back upon both their right and left, and a substantial advantage seemed thus to have been gained.  That the Confederate success was not complete, seems to have resulted from the failure to seize the Round-Top Hill.  The crisis of the battle had undoubtedly been the moment when Hood was so near capturing this position—­in reference to the importance of which we quoted General Meade’s own words.  It was saved to the Federal army by the presence of mind, it seems, of a single officer, and the gallantry of a single brigade.  Such are the singular chances of battle, in which the smallest causes so often effect the greatest results.