[Footnote 1:  Colonel Freemantle.  He was present, and speaks from observation.] Contempt of an adversary is dangerous, and pride goes before a fall.  The truth of these pithy adages was now about to be shown.

General Lee, it is said, shared the general confidence of his troops, and was carried away by it.  He says in his report “Finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountain with our large trains; at the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy’s main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging-parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops.  A battle thus became in a measure unavoidable.”  But, even after the battle, when the Southern army was much weaker, it was found possible, without much difficulty, to “withdraw through the mountains” with the trains.  A stronger motive than this is stated in the next sentence of General Lee’s report:”  Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.”  The meaning of the writer of these words is plain.  The Federal troops had been defeated with little difficulty in the first day’s fight; it seemed probable that a more serious conflict would have similar results; and a decisive victory promised to end the war.

General Meade, it seems, scarcely expected to be attacked.  He anticipated a movement on Lee’s part, over the Emmetsburg road southward. [Footnote:  Testimony of General Meade before the war committee.] By giving that direction to his army, General Lee would have forced his adversary to retire from his strong position on Cemetery Hill, or come out and attack him; whether, however, it was desirable on General Lee’s part to run the risk of such an attack on the Southern column in transitu, it is left to others better able than the present writer to determine.

This unskilled comment must pass for what it is worth.  It is easy, after the event, for the smallest to criticise the greatest.  Under whatever influences, General Lee determined not to retreat, either through the South Mountain or toward Emmetsburg, but marshalled his army for an attack on the position held by General Meade.

The Southern lines were drawn up on Seminary Ridge, and on the ground near Gettysburg.  Longstreet’s corps was posted on the right, opposite the Federal left, near the southern end of Cemetery Ridge.  Next came Hill’s corps, extending along the crest nearly to Gettysburg.  There it was joined by Ewell’s line, which, passing through the town, bent round, adapting itself to the position of the Federal right which held the high ground, curving round in the shape of a hook, at the north end of the ridge.