retreating up the slope of Cemetery Range, in his front.  The propriety of pursuit, with a view to seizing this strong position, was obvious, and General Lee sent an officer of his staff with a message to General Ewell, to the effect that “he could see the enemy flying, that they were disorganized, and that it was only necessary to push on vigorously, and the Cemetery heights were ours.” [Footnote:  The officer who carried the order is our authority for this statement.] Just about the moment, it would seem, when this order was dispatched—­about half-past four—­General Hill, who had joined Lee on the ridge, “received a message from General Ewell, requesting him (Hill) to press the enemy in front, while he performed the same operation on his right.”  This statement is taken from the journal of Colonel Freemantle, who was present and noted the hour.  He adds:  “The pressure was accordingly applied, in a mild degree, but the enemy were too strongly posted, and it was too late in the evening for a regular attack.”  General Ewell, an officer of great courage and energy, is said to have awaited the arrival of his third division (Johnson’s) before making a decisive assault.  Upon the arrival of Johnson, about sunset, General Ewell prepared to advance and seize upon the eastern terminus of the Cemetery Range, which commanded the subsequent Federal position.  At this moment General Lee sent him word to “proceed with his troops to the [Confederate] right, in case he could do nothing where he was;” he proceeded to General Lee’s tent thereupon to confer with him, and the result was that it was agreed to first assault the hill on the right.  It was now, however, after midnight, and the attack was directed by Lee to be deferred until the next morning.

It was certainly unfortunate that the advance was not then made; but Lee, in his report, attributes no blame to any one.  “The attack,” he says, “was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy’s force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops.”

The failure to press the enemy immediately after their retreat, with the view of driving them from and occupying Cemetery Heights, is susceptible of an explanation which seems to retrieve the Southern commander and his subordinates from serious criticism.  The Federal forces had been driven from the ground north and west of Gettysburg, but it was seen now that the troops thus defeated constituted only a small portion of General Meade’s army, and Lee had no means of ascertaining, with any degree of certainty, that the main body was not near at hand.  The fact was not improbable, and it was not known that Cemetery Hill was not then in their possession.  The wooded character of the ground rendered it difficult for General Lee, even from his elevated position on Seminary Ridge, to discover whether the heights opposite were, or were not, held by a strong force.  Infantry were visible there; and in the plain in front the cavalry of General Buford were drawn up, as though ready to accept battle.  It was not until after the battle that it was known that the heights might have been seized upon—­General Hancock, who had succeeded Reynolds, having, to defend them, but a single brigade.  This fact was not known to Lee; the sun was now declining, and the advance upon Cemetery Hill was deferred until the next day.