This order was certainly plain up to a certain point.  Stuart was to harass and embarrass the movements of the enemy, in case they attempted to cross to the north bank of the Potomac.  When they did cross, he also was to pass the river, either east or west of the Blue Ridge, “as in his judgment should seem best.”  So far the order was unmistakable.  The river was to be crossed at such point as Stuart should select, either on the lower waters, or in the Valley.  Lee added, however, that this movement should be made in such a manner as to enable Stuart to “take position on the right of our column as it advanced”—­the meaning appearing to be that the cavalry should move between the two armies, in order to guard the Southern flank as it advanced into the Cumberland Valley.  Circumstances arose, however, which rendered it difficult for Stuart to move on the line thus indicated with sufficient promptness to render his services valuable.  The enemy crossed at Leesburg while the Southern cavalry was near Middleburg; and, from the jaded condition of his horses, Stuart feared that he would be unable, in case he crossed above, to place his column between the two armies then rapidly advancing.  He accordingly took the bold resolution of passing the Potomac below Leesburg, designing to shape his course due northward toward Harrisburg, the objective point of the Southern army.  This he did—­crossing at Seneca Falls—­but on the march he was delayed by many incidents.  Near Rockville he stopped to capture a large train of Federal wagons; at Westminster and Hanovertown he was temporarily arrested by combats with the Federal cavalry; and, ignorant as he was of the concentration of Lee’s troops upon Gettysburg, he advanced rapidly toward Carlisle, where, in the midst of an attack on that place, he was recalled by Lee.

Such were the circumstances leading to, and the incidents attending, this movement.  The reader must form his own opinion of the amount of blame to be justly attached to Stuart.  He always declared, and asserted in his report of these occurrences, that he had acted in exact obedience to his orders; but, on the contrary, as appears from General Lee’s report, those orders were meant to prescribe a different movement.  He had marched in one sense on “the right” of the Southern column “as it advanced;” but in another sense he had not done so.  Victory at Gettysburg would have silenced all criticism of this difference of construction; but, unfortunately, the event was different, and the strictures directed at Stuart were natural.  The absence of the cavalry unquestionably embarrassed Lee greatly; but, in his report, he is moderate and guarded, as usual, in his expressions.  “The absence of cavalry,” he says, “rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information” of General Meade’s movements; and “the march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal army been known.”