These detached statements, which may seem unduly minute, are made in justice to a brave soldier, who can no longer defend himself.

XII.

THE MARCH TO GETTYSBURG.

This attempt of the enemy to penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley.  The Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, still remained facing General Hill; and, two days after the Fleetwood fight.  General Hooker moved up the river with his main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near Beverley’s Ford.  But these movements were disregarded by Lee.  On the same day Ewell’s corps moved rapidly toward Chester Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having in three days marched seventy miles.

The position of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger, and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of soldiership in the general commanding it.  In face of an enemy whose force was at least equal to his own,[Footnote:  General Hooker stated his “effective” at this time to have been diminished to eighty thousand infantry.] Lee had extended his line until it stretched over a distance of about one hundred miles.  When Ewell came in sight of Winchester, Hill was still opposite Fredericksburg, and Longstreet half-way between the two in Culpepper.  Between the middle and rear corps was interposed the Rapidan River, and between the middle and advanced corps the Blue Ridge Mountains.  General Hooker’s army was on the north bank of the Rappahannock, well in hand, and comparatively massed, and the situation of Lee’s army seemed excellent for the success of a sudden blow at it.

It seems that the propriety of attacking the Southern army while thus in transitu, suggested itself both to General Hooker and to President Lincoln, but they differed as to the point and object of the attack.  In anticipation of Lee’s movement, General Hooker had written to the President, probably suggesting a counter-movement across the Rappahannock, somewhere near Fredericksburg, to threaten Richmond, and thus check Lee’s advance.  This, however.  President Lincoln refused to sanction.

“In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock,” President Lincoln wrote to General Hooker, “I would by no means cross to the south of it.  I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other”

Five days afterward the President wrote:  “I think Lee’s army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point.  If he comes toward the Upper Potomac, fight him when opportunity offers.  If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.”