The plan of moving the Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal territory, seems to have been the result of many circumstances.  The country was elated with the two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and the people were clamorous for active operations against an enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern steel.  The army, which had been largely augmented by the return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall of Longstreet’s two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal victory and a treaty of peace.

Lee yielded to this view of things rather than urged it.  He was not opposed to an offensive policy, and seems, indeed, to have shared the opinion of Jackson that “the Scipio Africanus policy” was the best for the South.  His theory from the beginning of the war had been, that the true policy of the South was to keep the enemy as far as possible from the interior, fighting on the frontier or on Federal soil, if possible.  That of the South would there thus be protected from the ravages of the enemy, and the further advantage would accrue, that the Confederate capital, Richmond, would at all times be safe from danger.  This was an important consideration, as events subsequently showed.  As long as the enemy were held at arm’s-length, north of the Rappahannock, Richmond, with her net-work of railroads connecting with every part of the South, was safe, and the Government, undisturbed in their capital, remained a power in the eyes of the world.  But, with an enemy enveloping the city, and threatening her lines of communication, the tenure of the place by the Government was uncertain.  When General Grant finally thus enveloped the city, and laid hold upon the railroads, Lee’s army was defeated, and the Government became fugitive, which alone would have struck a mortal blow to its prestige and authority.

It was to arrive at these results, which his sagacity discerned, that Lee always advocated such movements as would throw back the enemy, and drive him, if possible, from the soil of Virginia.  Another important consideration was the question of supplies.  These were at all times deficient in the Confederate armies, and it was obviously the best policy to protect as much territory, from which supplies might be drawn, as possible.  More than ever before, these supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper, “If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in Pennsylvania.”