works near Alrich’s house, on the road running eastward from the enemy’s camps; and General Stuart and General Wright, who had moved to the left, and advanced upon the enemy’s front near the point called “The Furnace,” had discovered the existence of powerful defences in that quarter also.  They had been met by a fierce and sudden artillery-fire from Federal epaulements; and here, as to the east of Chancellorsville, the enemy had evidently fortified their position.

Under these circumstances, it was necessary to discover, if possible, some more favorable opening for an attack.  There remained but one other—­General Hooker’s right, west of Chancellorsville; but to divide the army, as would be necessary in order to attack in that quarter, seemed an undertaking too hazardous to be thought of.  To execute such a plan of assault with any thing like a hope of success, General Lee would be compelled to detach considerably more than half of his entire force.  This would leave in General Hooker’s front a body of troops too inconsiderable to make any resistance if he advanced his lines, and thus the movement promised to result in the certain destruction of one portion of the army, to be followed by a triumphant march of the Federal forces upon Richmond.  In the council of war between Lee and Jackson, on the night of the 1st of May, these considerations were duly weighed, and the whole situation discussed.  In the end, the hazardous movement against General Hooker’s right, beyond Chancellorsville, was determined upon.  This was first suggested, it is said, by Jackson—­others have attributed the suggestion to Lee.  The point is not material.  The plan was adopted, and Lee determined to detach a column of about twenty-one thousand men, under Jackson, to make the attack on the next day.  His plan was to await the arrival of Jackson at the point selected for attack, meanwhile engaging the enemy’s attention by demonstrations in their front.  When Jackson’s guns gave the signal that he was engaged, the force in front of the enemy was to advance and participate in the assault; and thus, struck in front and flank at once.  General Hooker, it was hoped, would be defeated and driven back across the Rappahannock.

There was another possible result, the defeat of Lee and Jackson by General Hooker.  But the desperate character of the situation rendered it necessary to disregard this risk.

By midnight this plan had been determined upon, and at dawn Jackson began to move.

JACKSON’S ATTACK AND FALL.

On the morning of the 2d of May, General Lee was early in the saddle, and rode to the front, where he remained in personal command of the force facing the enemy’s main line of battle throughout the day.

This force consisted of the divisions of Anderson and McLaws, and amounted to thirteen thousand men.  That left at Fredericksburg, as we have said, under General Early, numbered six thousand men; and the twenty-one thousand which Jackson had taken with him, to strike at the enemy’s right, made up the full body of troops under Lee, that is to say, a little over forty thousand, artillerymen included.  The cavalry, numbering four or five thousand, were, like the absent Federal cavalry, not actually engaged.