General Hooker had crossed the Rappahannock with a force of one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, and had, without obstruction, secured a position so strong, he declared, that Lee must either “ingloriously fly,” or fight a battle in which “certain destruction awaited him.”  So absolutely convinced, indeed, was the Federal commander, of the result of the coming encounter, that he had jubilantly described the Southern army as “the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac,” which, in the event of the retreat of the Confederates, would “be after them.”  There seemed just grounds for this declaration, whatever question may have arisen of the good taste displayed by General Hooker in making it.  The force opposed to him was in all about forty-seven thousand men, but, as cavalry take small part in pitched battles, Lee’s fighting force was only about forty thousand.  To drive back forty thousand with one hundred and twenty thousand would not apparently prove difficult, and it was no doubt this conviction which had occasioned the joyous exclamation of General Hooker.

But his own act, and the nerve of his adversary, had defeated every thing.  Instead of retreating with his small force upon Richmond, Lee had advanced to accept or deliver battle.  This bold movement, which General Hooker does not seem to have anticipated, paralyzed his energies.  He had not only crossed the two rivers without loss, but had taken up a strong position, where he could manoeuvre his army perfectly, when, in consequence of Lee’s approach with the evident intent of fighting, he had ceased to advance, hesitated, and ended by retiring.  This is a fair summary of events up to the night of the 1st of May.  General Hooker had advanced boldly; he was now falling back.  He had foretold that his adversary would “ingloriously fly;” and that adversary was pressing him closely.  The Army of the Potomac, he had declared, would soon be “after” the Army of Northern Virginia; but, from the appearance of things at the moment, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed “after” the Army of the Potomac.  We use General Hooker’s own phrases—­they are expressive, if not dignified.  They are indeed suited to the subject, which contains no little of the grotesque.  That anticipations and expressions so confident should have been met with a “commentary of events” so damaging, was sufficient, had the occasion not been so tragic, to cause laughter in the gravest of human beings.

Lee’s intent was now unmistakable.  Instead of falling back from the Rappahannock to some line of defence nearer Richmond, where the force under Longstreet, at Suffolk, might have rejoined him, with other reenforcements, he had plainly resolved, with the forty or fifty thousand men of his command, to meet General Hooker in open battle, and leave the event to Providence.  A design so bold would seem to indicate in Lee a quality which at that time he was not thought to possess—­the willingness to risk decisive defeat by military movements depending