It was no part of the original plan of the Federal commander to permit himself to be cooped up in this difficult and embarrassing region, where it was impossible to manoeuvre his large army.  The selection of the Wilderness around Chancellorsville, as the ground of battle, was dictated by Lee.  General Hooker, it seems, endeavored to avoid being thus shut up in the thicket, and hampered in his movements.  Finding that the Confederate force, retiring from in front of Ely’s and United States Fords, had, on reaching Chancellorsville, continued to fall back in the direction of Fredericksburg, he followed them steadily, passed through the Wilderness, and, emerging into the open country beyond, rapidly began forming line of battle on ground highly favorable to the manoeuvring of his large force in action.  A glance at the map will indicate the importance of this movement, and the great advantages secured by it.  The left of General Hooker’s line, nearest the river, was at least five miles in advance of Chancellorsville, and commanded Banks’s Ford, thereby shortening fully one-half the distance of General Sedgwick’s march from Fredericksburg, by enabling him to use the ford in question as a place of crossing to the south bank, and uniting his column with the main body.  The centre and right of the Federal army had in like manner emerged from the thickets of the Wilderness, and occupied cleared ground, sufficiently elevated to afford them great advantages.

This was in the forenoon of the 1st of May, when there was no force in General Hooker’s front, except the eight thousand men of Anderson at Tabernacle Church.  Jackson had marched at midnight from the Massaponnax Hills, with a general order from Lee to “attack and repulse the enemy,” but had not yet arrived.  There was thus no serious obstacle in the path of the Federal commander, who had it in his power, it would seem, to mass his entire army on the commanding ground which his vanguard already occupied.  Lee was aware of the importance of the position, and, had he not been delayed by the feint of General Sedgwick, would himself have seized upon it.  As it was, General Hooker seemed to have won the prize in the race, and Lee would, apparently, be forced to assail him on his strong ground, or retire in the direction of Richmond.

The movements of the enemy had, however, been so rapid that Lee’s dispositions seem to have been made before they were fully developed and accurately known to him.  He had sent forward Jackson, and now proceeded to follow in person, leaving only a force of about six thousand men, under Early, to defend the crossing at Fredericksburg.  The promptness of these movements of the Confederate commander is noticed by Northern writers.  “Lee, with instant perception of the situation,” says an able historian, “now seized the masses of his force, and, with the grasp of a Titan, swung them into position, as a giant might fling a mighty stone from a sling.” [Footnote:  Mr. Swinton, in “Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.”  Whether the force under Lee could be justly described as “mighty,” however, the reader will form his own opinion.]