force could have made any impression upon them, and the result was such as might have been expected.  The men lost confidence in the military capacity of their commander, and in their own powers.  After the double repulse at Marye’s Hill and in front of Jackson, the troops, looking at the ground strewed with dead and wounded, were in no condition to go forward hopefully to another struggle which promised to be equally bloody.

The Southern army was naturally in a condition strongly in contrast with that of their adversary.  They had repulsed the determined assault of the Federal columns with comparative ease on both flanks.  Jackson’s first line, although pierced and driven back, soon rallied, and checked the enemy until the second line came up, when General Meade was driven back, the third line not having moved from its position along the road near the Hamilton House.  On the left, Longstreet had repulsed the Federal charge with his artillery and two small brigades.  The loss of the Confederates in both these encounters was much less than that of their adversaries[1], a natural result of the circumstances; and thus, instead of sharing the depression of their opponents, the Southern troops were elated, and looked forward to a renewal of the battle with confidence in themselves and in their leader.

[Footnote 1:  “Our loss during the operation, since the movements of the enemy began, amounts to about eighteen hundred killed and wounded.”—­Lee’s Report.  Federal authorities state the Northern loss at a little over twelve thousand; the larger part, no doubt, in the attack on Marye’s Hill.]

It is not necessary to offer much comment upon the manner in which General Burnside had attacked.  He is said, by his critics, not to have, at the time, designed the turning movement against General Lee’s right, upon which point the present writer is unable to decide.  That movement would seem to have presented the sole and only chance of success for the Federal arms, as the successful advance of General Franklin’s fifty-five or sixty thousand men up the old Richmond road would have compelled Lee to retire his whole right wing, to protect it from an assault in flank and reverse.  What dispositions he would have made under these circumstances must be left to conjecture; but, it is certain that the blow would have proved a serious one, calling for the display of all his military ability.  In the event, however, that this was the main great aim of General Burnside, his method of carrying out his design insured, it would seem, its failure.  Ten thousand men only were to clear the way for the flanking movement, in order to effect which object it was necessary to crush Jackson.  So that it may be said that the success of the plan involved the repulse of one-half Lee’s army with ten thousand men.