His words are:  “The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack....  I obtained, from a colored man at the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road which proved to be correct.  I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left.”  It is difficult for those familiar with the ground referred to, to understand how this “new road,” a mere country bridle-path, as it were, extending along in the rear of Lee’s right wing, could have been regarded as a topographical feature of any importance.  The road, which remains unchanged, and may be seen by any one to-day, was insignificant in a military point of view, and, in attaching such importance to seizing it, the Federal commander committed a grave error.

What seems to have been really judicious in his plan, was the turning movement determined on against Lee’s right, along the old Richmond road, running from the direction of the river past the end of the ridge occupied by the Confederates, and so southward.  To break through at this point was the only hope of success, and General Burnside had accordingly resolved, he declared, upon “a rapid movement down the old Richmond road” with Franklin’s large command.  Unfortunately, however, this wise design was complicated with another, most unwise, to send forward a division, first, to seize the crest of the ridge near the point where it sinks into the plain.  On this crest were posted the veterans of Jackson, commanded in person by that skilful soldier.  Three lines of infantry, supported by artillery, were ready to receive the Federal attack, and, to force back this stubborn obstacle, General Burnside sent a division.  The proof is found in his order to General Franklin at about six o’clock on the morning of the battle:  “Send out a division at least ... to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton’s,” which was the ground whereon Jackson’s right rested.

An attack on the formidable position known as Marye’s Hill, on Lee’s left, west of Fredericksburg, was also directed to be made by the same small force.  The order to General Sumner was to “form a column of a division, for the purpose of pushing in the direction of the Telegraph and Plank roads, for the purpose of seizing the heights in the rear of the town;” or, according to another version, “up the Plank road to its intersection with the Telegraph road, where they will divide, with the object of seizing the heights on both sides of those roads.”

The point of “intersection” here referred to was the locality of what has been called “that sombre, fatal, terrible stone wall,” just under Marye’s Hill, where the most fearful slaughter of the Federal forces took place.  Marye’s Hill is a strong position, and its importance was well understood by Lee.  Longstreet’s infantry was in heavy line of battle behind it, and the crest bristled with artillery.  There was still less hope here of effecting any thing with “a division” than on the Confederate right held by Jackson.