Referring to the policy of the ministry, M. Szemere says “that Count Louis Bathyanyi declared, on the 31st March, that the obligation enjoined by the Pragmatic Sanction was such that Hungary was bound thereby to defend the territorial integrity of the Austrian monarchy, but that they (the ministers) would carefully avoid interfering in the internal affairs of the states that constituted this monarchy.”  Irrespective of this—­that Count Bathyanyi explained the policy in March, when Hungary enjoyed perfect peace, whereas the debate on the Italian question happened in the midst of most threatening civil wars carried on directly by Austria—­it must be remembered that if by the 1st article of the Pragmatic Sanction Hungary was bound to afford aid to Austria etiam contra vim externam, that same article provided that the States composing the realm of Hungary were to be preserved by the monarch aeque indivisibiliter as his hereditary estates; and that by the 3d article of that celebrated law the Sovereign promised, for himself and his successors, to compel his subjects of every state and degree to observe the laws and rights of Hungary.  It is therefore evident that the infraction of this law, by the countenance and aid furnished to the Serbs (as also to Jellachich), fully exonerated the Hungarians from sending troops to Italy before they had provided for the safety of their country, and fully justified them and their responsible minister for drawing the attention of their Sovereign to it in the address to the Crown.  M. Szemere talks of protecting the integrity of the Austrian empire, and carefully avoiding to interfere with the internal affairs of other states.  The Czar may indeed exclaim, with M. Szemere, that in sending his Cossacks into Hungary he never intended to interfere in our internal affairs.

The second charge, as to Kossuth’s striving to concentrate in his person all power and authority, is, I fear, indicative of the animus which prompted M. Szemere to write these letters, namely, jealousy of his great countryman.  The charge, however, is entirely without foundation:  and the only question is, as to how Kossuth acquired such unbounded influence over his countrymen of every rank and station.  The means by which Kossuth gained such an ascendancy over his colleagues, M. Szemere himself must own, were, the implicit confidence the country placed in his patriotism, and the conviction it had acquired of his genius and indefatigable activity.  In moments of extreme danger no name was heard but that of Kossuth.  I am far from asserting that all Kossuth has done is exempt from censure; but it must, on the other hand, be admitted that all that was grand in our revolution happened by his instrumentality.  His mere appearance, as, for instance, in Debreczin, January, 1849, when the second danger seemed to overwhelm the country, roused the frightened people of the Thesis, who crowded under the national standard and shattered to pieces the Austrian forces.