opened the debate on the Italian question, July 22, affairs looked quite different from what they appeared to be when the protocol was drawn up.  The treachery of the dynasty broke upon the mind of the most careless, and its connexions with the leaders of the rebellious tribes had become undeniable facts.  It was during that short time, from July 5 to July 22, that our national forces met in the Serbian entrenchments of St. Thomas, Foeldvar, and Turia, regular Austrian soldiers:  Meyerhofe, the Austrian consul at Belgrade, was openly recruiting bands of Servians to reinforce the insurgents; nay, it became even evident that General Bechtold, appointed by His Majesty to lead the faithful Hungarians against the rebellious Serbs, led them on in order to get them the sooner decimated and broken.  Some members of the opposition, headed by General Perczel, declaimed loudly against the cowardly and fallacious policy of the ministry, resolving to compel ministers to resign or to induce them to take some more efficacious measures.  In short, during this space of time, the government and people found themselves in quite a new position.  Kossuth, in concert with the ministry, moved a levy of 200,000 men (July 11), which motion the Assembly hailed with unparalleled enthusiasm, and which the people witnessed with approval, as affording a guarantee of their liberties.  It was in the midst of these moments of excitement and temporary distress that Kossuth, as the most popular member of the cabinet, was pointed out as the person most fitted to undertake the very difficult task of speaking on the Italian question alluded to by M. Szemere.  Public opinion, aided by the opposition of the house, was convinced that Austria, after having subjugated the Lombard-Venetians with Hungarian troops, would then turn to Hungary, the enslavement of which might more easily be executed by the country’s being bereft of a number of stout arms indispensable to her own defence.  Kossuth therefore, as a man of true liberal principles, while acknowledging the ground to be right upon which the opposition moved, professed in the speech alluded to that he had agreed then with his colleagues in respect to the Italian question, on the ground that the moral power of the protocol would suffice, although as a private individual he could not help rejoicing at the victories of the Italian people.  Now, I submit it to every enlightened Englishman to decide whether Kossuth evinced a want of civic virtue in declaring that, as a man who wished freedom for himself, he could not rejoice in the sending of troops to subjugate another people struggling against the same tyrant?