It is precisely to the fact of all classes, without distinction, being equally aware of the cabals of the dynasty, that may be ascribed the success of the Hungarian insurrection.  It was not one man, nor a party, nor a conspiracy, nor terrorism, that awakened that spontaneous enthusiasm with which the people rushed to arms.  Kossuth may have been the rallying cry; but he was not the cause of the war.  For several months the people had witnessed the equivocal conduct of the dynasty; had seen that its words were belied by its deeds; had seen that the rebels were everywhere led by Imperial officers; and finally beheld Jellachich, a high functionary of the Hungarian Crown, invade the country at the head of an Austro-Croatian army.  It was then, and not till then, that the nation cried, as with one voice—­the King is a traitor.  From that day began the Hungarian revolution.  On that day the monarchical feeling was extinguished.  What no one had thought it possible to accomplish was accomplished by the dynasty itself.

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APPENDIX III.—­Extracts from a Letter to the ‘Daily News,’ in February, 1852, by a, “HUNGARIAN EXILE,” in reply to a Letter from SZEMERE, to the ‘London Examiner.’

[I am personally acquainted with the accomplished and intelligent “Exile;” but as he is absent from England, I cannot obtain permission to publish his name.]

It was more than two months after the civil war had been raging in the Banat and Transylvania that the question of giving fresh troops for the suppression of the Italian war was brought before the Assembly at Pesth, July 22, 1846.  Now, what are the accusations M. Szemere brings forth against Kossuth in reference to the Italian question?  The pith of M. Szemere’s reasoning is, that the ministry agreed, in the protocol of July 5, upon construing the Pragmatic Sanction as binding Hungary to protect the integrity of Austria; “yet that Kossuth, as the organ of the ministry, spoke in a way as if he did not approve of the policy, and sought to make the public believe that the protocol was merely a moral demonstration:”  further, that when the opposition denied the obligation of Hungary to defend Austria, the ministry refused to enter into any discussion on an acknowledged principle of constitutional law.

In order to show the utter hollowness of this attack, it may be sufficient to look at the date and circumstances M. Szemere talks of.  The protocol in question was agreed upon on July 5th, the day when the parliament met to provide for the defence of the country.  The members, inexperienced in foreign politics and ignorant of the cabals of courts, although presuming that the civil war was kindled in Vienna, were at first blinded by the royal convocation of the Diet to provide for the safety of the country; putting, moreover, implicit confidence in the sagacity and goodwill of the ministry.  When however Kossuth