If we review the history of classical antiquity as a whole, we may almost say that freedom of thought was like the air men breathed.  It was taken for granted and nobody thought about it.  If seven or eight thinkers at Athens were penalized for heterodoxy, in some and perhaps in most of these cases heterodoxy was only a pretext.  They do not invalidate the general facts that the advance of knowledge was not impeded by prejudice, or science retarded by the weight of unscientific authority.  The educated Greeks were tolerant because they were friends of reason and did not set up any authority to overrule reason.  Opinions were not imposed except by argument; you were not expected to receive some “kingdom of heaven” like a little child, or to prostrate your intellect before an authority claiming to be infallible.

But this liberty was not the result of a conscious policy or deliberate conviction, and therefore it was precarious.  The problems

[51] of freedom of thought, religious liberty, toleration, had not been forced upon society and were never seriously considered.  When Christianity confronted the Roman government, no one saw that in the treatment of a small, obscure, and, to pagan thinkers, uninteresting or repugnant sect, a principle of the deepest social importance was involved.  A long experience of the theory and practice of persecution was required to base securely the theory of freedom of thought.  The lurid policy of coercion which the Christian Church adopted, and its consequences, would at last compel reason to wrestle with the problem and discover the justification of intellectual liberty.  The spirit of the Greeks and Romans, alive in their works, would, after a long period of obscuration, again enlighten the world and aid in re-establishing the reign of reason, which they had carelessly enjoyed without assuring its foundations.

[1] This has been shown very clearly by Professor Jackson in the article on “Socrates” in the Encyclopoedia Britannica, last edition.

[2] He stated the theological difficulty as to the origin of evil in this form:  God either wishes to abolish evil and cannot, or can and will not, or neither can nor will, or both can and will.  The first three are unthinkable, if he is a God worthy of the name; therefore the last alternative must be true.  Why then does evil exist?  The inference is that there is no God, in the sense of a governor of the world.

[3] An admirable appreciation of the poem will be found in R. V. Tyrrell’s Lectures on Latin Poetry.

[4] For the evidence of the Apologists see A. Bouche-Leclercq, Religious Intolerance and Politics (French, 1911) —­a valuable review of the whole subject.

[5] This is Gibbon’s translation.

CHAPTER III

REASON IN PRISON

(The middle ages)

About ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great adopted Christianity.  This momentous decision inaugurated