The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of Missionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain.  Lookout Mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in Lookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us.  In addition to this there was an intrenched line in Chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to Lookout Mountain, to make the investment complete.  Besides the fortifications on Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front.  The enemy’s pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse.  At one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water.  The Union lines were shorter than those of the enemy.

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below.  Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged.  The enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies.  The Union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day’s fighting.

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by Generals Howard and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Rosecrans.  It would have been folly to send them to Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there.  They were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them.  Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration at Bridgeport.

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops.

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the following details were made:  General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up by Whitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown’s Ferry.  General Palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite Whitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker’s rear after he had passed.  Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under General Smith directly from Chattanooga.  Eighteen hundred of them, under General Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon