As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains.  The withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies.  This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by General Ferrero, belonging to Burnside’s corps.  Ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards Fredericksburg.  The enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken.

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be.  Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the Confederate capital when it was in danger.  Butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee.  Hoke was no longer needed in North Carolina; and Sigel’s troops having gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley.

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time.  It occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage.  Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used.  Before leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences of Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons.  This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used.  In fact, before reaching the James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely.

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench.  So I issued the following orders: 

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., VA., May 18, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnside from the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright.  Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench.  Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps.  To-morrow night, at twelve or one o’clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of the Fredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him.  If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench.