Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 545 pages of information about Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2.

Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 545 pages of information about Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2.

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold:  first, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field.  But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania.  Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced.  Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.  Accordingly he ordered Longstreet’s corps—­now commanded by Anderson—­to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania.  But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night.  By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania.  It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee’s orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.  My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line.  Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond.  The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill’s corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described:  the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.  But accident often decides the fate of battle.

Sheridan’s cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd’s Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close.  He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee’s troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania.  But Meade changed Sheridan’s orders to Merritt—­who was holding the bridge—­on his arrival at Todd’s Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up.  Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in Merritt’s orders.  Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.

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Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant — Volume 2 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.