Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner’s division to reinforce Longstreet.  He also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered it back.  It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there.  It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side.  Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry, in full view of Bragg’s troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack.  They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault.  Bragg knew it was Sherman’s troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger.  But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of.  If he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle.  It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely.  It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it.

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party.  The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:  but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report.  There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could.  Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before.  If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union.

General William F. Smith’s services in these battles had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion.  I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination.  I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy.  My recommendation was heeded and the appointment made.