Sherman’s movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this.  General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could.  This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy.  I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee.  On the 14th of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas: 

“CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

“General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama.  His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith’s command.  The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.  It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.  Hood’s army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby’s movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be threefold:  first, to attract as much of the enemy’s force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy’s line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field.  Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against.  This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

“Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient.  It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week.  I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn.  If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.