On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer.  I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.  This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman’s march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time.  I had some time before depleted Thomas’s army to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something.  Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements.  I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer.  General Granger had got down to New Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, I said to Canby:  “I am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad.  I have directed that none be sent.  Thomas’s army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to be co-operative with Sherman’s last.  This has now entirely failed.  I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.  Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior—­to Montgomery and to Selma.  Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy’s roads in the interior can be kept broken.”

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed.