moved up in like manner.  Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building.  Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed.  Car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars.  Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished.  But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity.  There were no rails except those in use.  To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten.  I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville.  The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material.  General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders.  The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles.

The enemy’s troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland.  Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness.  Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside’s relief; calling attention to the importance of holding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc.  We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train.  Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had.  There was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler’s cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside.  The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up.  The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside’s army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief.  On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas peremptorily to