and leave the latter place garrisoned.  Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field.

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky.  I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did.  On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed:  that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga.  To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him.  In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sherman’s army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville.

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped.  Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at Chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at Bridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence.  There were already with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster’s and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville, for its defence.  Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field.  Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated.  These reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of.

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating.  He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way:  by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front.  But it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape.