I have reason to believe that M. Zola regards the death of President Faure as the crucial turning-point in the whole Dreyfus business.  Had Faure lived every means would still have been employed to shield the guilty; all the influence of the Elysee would, as before, have been brought to bear against the unhappy prisoner of Devil’s Island.

During those January and February days M. Zola was an eager reader of the newspapers.  Rumours of all kinds were in circulation, and once again in M. Zola’s mind did despondency alternate with hopefulness.  I must say, however, that he was not particularly impressed by Paul Deroulede’s attempt to induce General Roget to march on the Elysee.  He regards Deroulede as a scarcely sane individual, and holds views on Parisian demonstrations which may surprise some of those who believe everything they read in the newspapers.

These views may be epitomised as follows:  The Government can always put down trouble in the streets when it desires to do so.  If trouble occurs it is because the Government allows it.  Three-fourths of the ‘demonstrations’ that have taken place in Paris during the last year or two have been simply ‘got up’ by professional agitators.  The men who start the shouting and the marching are paid for their services, the tariff being as a rule two francs per demonstration.  With 500 francs, that is 20 l., one can get 250 men together.  These are joined by as many fools and a small contingent of enthusiasts, and then you have a rumpus on the boulevards, and half the newspapers in Europe announcing on the morrow:  ‘Serious Disturbances in Paris.  Impending Revolution.’  Some people may ask, Where does the money for many of these demonstrations come from?  The answer is that it comes largely from much the same sources as those whence General Boulanger’s funds were derived—­that is, from the Orleanist party.

As for military insubordination, plotting, or anything of that kind, M. Zola often pointed out to me that no general could effect a revolution, for the simple reason that he could not rely on his men to follow him in an illegal attempt.  It was quite possible that now and again other generals besides Boulanger had dreamt of overturning the Republic, but they had not the means to do so.  It was as likely as not that the officer foolhardy enough to make the attempt would be shot in the back by some of the Socialists among the rank and file.  Boulanger no doubt could have counted on a good many men and ‘non-coms.,’ as he was popular with them, but few if any officers above the rank of captain would have followed him.

To-day, moreover, intense jealousy still reigns among the French general officers.  There is not one among them of sufficient pre-eminence and popularity to gather round him a large contingent of military men of high rank for any political purpose.  And this, of course—­quite apart from the opinions of the masses—­largely makes for a continuance of the Republican regime.