During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear.  The enemy fled precipitately.  This was between three and four o’clock.  I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr’s division just coming in.  Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner.  Hovey’s division, and McPherson’s two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe.  I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him.  The pursuit was continued until after dark.

The battle of Champion’s Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle.  Every man of Hovey’s division and of McPherson’s two divisions was engaged during the battle.  No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before.  Osterhaus’s and A. J. Smith’s divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven.  Their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy’s line.  McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing.  I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation.  These traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come.  It is true, in front of McClernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off.  Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank.  Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time.  To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground.  Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.

We had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged.  This excludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand’s command except Hovey.  Our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing.  Hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing—­more than one-third of his division.