At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky; the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with the Mobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to Bear Creek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis.  My entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive.  By moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations.  My moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at about the same number.  General McPherson commanded my left wing and General C. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the right wing.  Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied Holly Springs and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad.  On the 8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad.  The road from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced.

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements.  There was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front.

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from Washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores.  The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy’s country from the country itself.

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a “Freedman’s Bureau” took its origin.  Orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily.  Humanity forbade allowing them to starve.  With such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about Grand Junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance.  There was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work.  This labor would support but a very limited percentage of them.  The plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe:  men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops.  To do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization