faith in “scraps of paper,” and had no scruple in tearing up the Treaty of Berlin on which the whole Balkan settlement had rested.  Nowhere was the outburst of feeling so violent as in Serbia and Montenegro, who had never ceased to dream of the lost Serb provinces.  For some months the two little States challenged the accomplished fact, and seemed bent on staking their very existence upon war with the great neighbouring Monarchy.  Aehrenthal remained unmoved by their cries of impotent fury and settled down to a trial of strength with his rival Izvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, who encouraged the sister Slavonic States in their resistance.  At length in March 1909 Germany stepped forward in “shining armour” to support her Austrian ally, and Russia, to avoid European war, gave way and abandoned the Serbs to their fate.  Nothing was left but a humiliating submission:  the Serbian Government was obliged to address a Note to the Great Powers, declaring that the annexation and internal condition of Bosnia did not in any way concern her.[1]

[Footnote 1:  This declaration was made the basis of the Austrian Note to Serbia in July 1914.]

Sec.5. The Renaissance of Serbia.—­From this diplomatic defeat dates the renaissance of Serbia.  It restored her to a sense of hard realities, and taught her to substitute hard work for loud talk.  So rough a challenge put the national spirit on its mettle.  The brief period between 1908 and 1912 worked a real transformation in Belgrade, which could not fail to impress those who took the trouble to look beneath the surface.  Nowhere was the change more marked than in the Serbian army, from which the regicide elements had been slowly but steadily eliminated.  The two Balkan wars of 1912-1913 revealed Serbia to the outside world as a military power, notable alike for the elan of its infantry, the high efficiency of its artillery, the close camaraderie of officers and men.  The first use made of her victories over the Turks was the occupation of northern Albania, her only possible outlet to the sea so long as Dalmatia remains in Austrian hands.  Austria-Hungary, who had only remained inactive because she had taken a Turkish victory for granted, now intervened, and by the creation of an artificial Albanian State vetoed Serbia’s expansion to the Adriatic.  The Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, short-sighted and indolent then as now, failed to realise that the North Albanian harbours, for obvious reasons of physical geography, could never be converted into naval bases, save at a prohibitive cost, and that their possession by Serbia, so far from being a menace to Austria, would involve the policing of a mountainous tract of country, inhabited by a turbulent and hostile population.  It ought to have been obvious to him that the moment had arrived for tempting the Serbs into the Austrian sphere of influence by the bait of generous commercial concessions through Bosnia and Dalmatia.  Several