supremacy of Great Britain is quarrelling, not with the British Government or the British people, but with the facts of history, of geography, and of the political evolution of the world.  The British Empire has not been built up, like the German, by the work of statesmen and thinkers; it is not the result, as Germans think, of far-seeing national policy or persistent ambition and “greed.”  It has slowly taken shape, during the last four centuries, since intercourse was opened up by sea between the different races of mankind, in accordance with the needs of the world as a whole.  Its collapse, at the hands of Germany or any other Power, would not mean the substitution of a non-British Empire for a British.  It would inaugurate a period of chaos in all five continents of the world.

The rulers and people of Germany, who counted on the “decadence” of Great Britain and the disintegration of her unorganised Empire, did not realise these simple facts.  Their lack of perception was due partly to their political inexperience; but a deeper reason for it lies in their wholly false estimate as to what “world-policy” and “world-empire” mean.  Trained in the Prussian school, they thought of them, like soldiers, in terms of conquest, glory, and prestige.  That way lies Napoleonism.  None of the great Powers is wholly free from blame on this score.  But until Germans realise, as the other Powers are slowly realising, that the true basis of Empire is not a love of glory but a sense of responsibility towards backward peoples, it will be hard to readmit them into the comity of the Great Powers.  Only a sense of common purposes and ideals, and of joint responsibility for world-problems, can make the Concert of Europe a reality.

Such is the general attitude of mind among the German public of the younger generation.  Let us now turn to the effect of this new outlook upon the political parties and groupings.

The chief result has been the extinction in Germany, as a political force, of the great liberal movement of the mid-nineteenth century which in England, France, and other Western countries has grown and developed during the last generation along lines corresponding to the needs of the new century.  The younger generation of middle-class Germans, indoctrinated with “orthodox” and “national” opinions at school and on military service, eschew the ideals which attracted their fathers and grandfathers in 1848; and, although so-called “liberal,” “free-thinking,” and Radical parties still exist, they have steadily been growing more militarist.  Militarism in its new guise, bound up with ideas of industrial and commercial expansion, is far more attractive to them than in the form of the Prussian Army.  The Emperor’s Navy Bills were from the first more popular in commercial and industrial circles than with the old Prussian Conservatives.  But as the years went on the Kaiser succeeded in converting both the Junkers to his Navy Bills and the middle